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Abstract: This paper examines the significance of stadium effects on the determination
of starting pitcher salaries. It models stadium effect first under the assumption of perfect
certainty, and then includes risk through uncertainty. Using starting pitchers’ statistics
between 1990 and 2008, this paper determines that the stadium effect is not significant in
the model with perfect certainty, but becomes significant when uncertainty (risk) is
introduced. An unexpected result of the test shows, however, that there is a fundamental
difference between the American League, where the stadium effect is significant, and the
National League, where it is insignificant in both models.
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Introduction
The Major League Baseball labor market provides a unique opportunity to test labor
economic theories on the determinants of compensation, and the findings of these tests
are easily transferable to other labor markets. Player performance statistics are publicly
available, as is player compensation. This public access to productivity and pay data
creates a distinct advantage over other labor markets, where productivity is usually
difficult to measure and compensation is often private.
Typical econometric papers that study Major League Baseball have focused on
the determination of player salaries through understanding each player’s respective
marginal revenue product (MRP). The MRPs for Major League Baseball players are
calculated through the various performance statistics that the players accumulate over
their careers. This paper broadens the analysis of salary determination by estimating the
effect of the differences in stadiums on player salaries. With new stadiums opening
around the country, there is much discussion about the effect certain types of ballparks
have on the statistics of players and teams.1 In particular, many of the new ballparks are
said to be “hitter’s parks”, often because of short home run fences or high elevation, both
of which give a distinct advantage to hitters over pitchers.2 Pitcher performance in these
stadiums would likely suffer and may reduce the pitcher’s marketability to move to other

1

There have not been any econometric studies. The discussion lies between journalists (e.g. ESPN) and
statisticians within Major League Baseball.
2

For example, stadiums like Coors Field are built high above sea level, giving the ball added lift when
traveling in the air, usually leading to more home runs.
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teams in the future. With this knowledge, do teams in a hitter’s park have to compensate
a pitcher for the expected reduction in his performance?3
The current literature misses the opportunity to test whether players are
compensated for the inherent risks they undertake when they choose a particular home
stadium. This paper includes both the known and the expected differences between
stadium effects and argues that the current models to determine player salaries cannot
fully explain the compensation of pitchers. This paper expands the literature in two
ways; it improves the explanatory power of the traditional MRP estimations, while it
simultaneously tests whether pitchers receive compensation for the risks inherent in
playing in a hitter’s park.
The remainder of this paper consists of five sections. Section 1 reviews the
previous literature that influences this paper. Section 2 explains the econometric theory
behind this question. Section 3 then summarizes the data that are used in the empirical
work. Section 4 presents the analysis of the data, including tests to ensure there are no
estimation issues, and regression results for both the perfect certainty model and the
uncertainty model. Section 5 concludes this study and provides ideas for future research.
1) Literature Review
Most research on player salaries in Major League Baseball tests the theoretical argument
that players, like other workers, are paid according to their MRP. Rottenberg (1956),
who was one of the first to conduct a study regarding player MRP, concluded that many
players were paid below their MRP. He argued that teams exploited the players during

3

The stadium effect comes from a team’s home ballpark only, as teams are unable to control the stadiums
they play in outside of the home park.
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the bargaining process, in the era before free agency. During this period, players could
only be free agents if their teams released them. Once a player was under contract
however, a constant renewal clause allowed teams to use the player at the same salary at
the end of each contract period.4
Scully (1974) econometrically measured baseball players’ values to determine
how overpaid or underpaid players are. He estimated player’s MRPs, and from that
produced a model to determine projected salary of the players. The model incorporated
equations for three variables: team revenue, team winning percentage, and team
performance. Scully estimated that teams paid players only 10 to 20 percent of their
MRP, likely caused by the player’s lack of bargaining power.5 Scully’s study, however,
was conducted before free agency and thus does not take all factors that we see today into
account.
Major League Baseball established free agency in 1975, and since then, the MRP
continues to be the chosen method to determine the value of players in the academic
literature. The recent literature, however, focus on position players because their
performance is fairly easy to compute.6 Fewer studies have focused on pitchers. A
pitcher’s individual performance is not as easily determined because many times it is a
reflection of the skill of the fielders behind the pitcher. One specific question that has not
been examined is whether stadiums affect pitcher salaries. Variation in a pitcher’s home

4

Free agency allows players to negotiate with teams for new contracts once their rookie contract expires.
Originally, there was a renewal clause in almost every contract, which allowed teams to renew a players’
contract, severely limiting the bargaining power of the player. After a 1975 lawsuit, this rule was changed.

5

The model also includes standard performance variables such as ERA, Innings Pitched, and Strikeouts.

6

The previous literature has also concluded that statistics are in fact the driving force for salary offers.
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stadium might affect his statistics and, to the extent that pay is based on statistics, his
salary.7
As free agency established itself in the baseball industry, newer studies began to
find that players were paid closer to their MRP. This is understandable, as once a player
can negotiate with any team and sell his services, he should sign with the team that pays
him closest to his MRP. Kahn (1993) updated Scully’s (1974) original research and used
career statistics, as opposed to season-by-season statistics, to determine the performance
factor for individual players. He argued that career statistics are better predictors of
future production and thus better represents what a team examines when it determines
player values.8 Kahn (1993) found that players were now paid right near their MRP.
Krautmann et al. (2003) separated pitchers from other players, and additionally
divided pitchers into starters, long-relievers (those who enter the game after the starter,
and before the stoppers), and stoppers (those who finish the game, typically the final
inning). The study determined that performance variables for the starters vary more than
for relievers and stoppers, and therefore may have a more significant effect on the
determination of a starter’s salary than for a reliever’s performance.9 This result suggests
that starters may be likely to feel the stadium effects more than relievers and stoppers. If
relievers and stoppers are typically strikeout pitchers, the difference between stadiums

7

A pitcher plays half of his games in his team’s home stadium each season.

8

Kahn (1993) did not, however, use counting statistics such as strikeouts and innings pitched, and instead
only used career ratios, such as ERA and winning percentage

9

Performance variables include strikeouts, walks, ERA, innings pitched, and type of pitcher. The variance
of pitcher-type is greater in starting pitchers than others. Starters can be strikeout pitchers, pitchers who
pitch to contact, or a combination of the two depending on the situation. Relievers and stoppers, however,
tend to fall mainly in the strikeout category.
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should not affect their statistics. Starters, however, vary in type. This would therefore
cause a starter’s statistics to reflect the stadium effect more than relievers and stoppers.
Starting pitchers allow the ball to be put in play more often than relievers, providing more
chances for the stadium to have an effect on the pitcher.
The dearth of studies in stadium effects leaves a hole in the literature. Goodman
and McAndrew (1993) offered the only study of stadium effects on player performance.
They tested how the performance of hitters varied when playing on either grass or
Astroturf, a surface typically found in domed stadiums. Using data from the late 1980s,
they concluded that dome stadiums with Astroturf were more conducive to offensive
players.10 This result is now outdated however, because most of the domed stadiums
studied are no longer in use and Astroturf is no longer the surface used in the new domes.
Few papers have addressed the role risk plays in salary determination in Major
League Baseball. Krautmann and Novak (2004) examine whether injury risks to MLB
catchers and second basemen had an effect on their salaries. They believed that
compensation might also have an effect on which team they choose to play for. The
results, however, found that there is no compensation for risk. They also tested
compensating wage differentials by examining a player’s desire to take a lower salary in
exchange for more desirable job conditions, specifically, living in cities that are located
in better climate zones. The authors concluded that players did indeed take a lesser salary
to accommodate their desire for a better climate, therefore allowing certain small-market
teams in the regions with the best climate to sign players otherwise out of reach. The

10

Statistics such as batting average and homeruns hit were higher in the fields with Astroturf.
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paper only analyzed hitters, however, once again citing the difficulty in evaluating
pitchers as the reason.
Substantial literature on risk and wage theory also exists outside of Major League
Baseball. One specific type of risk that is relevant to this thesis is earnings risk in a labor
market. The initial studies of earnings risk focus on employment instability. Feinberg
(1981) used a six-year survey of 1,419 families and determined that the variation found in
income over time is in fact correlated with salary determination.11 Workers of equal
characteristics will receive different salaries if one has a higher degree of employment
risk. That worker will receive compensation for earnings risk in the form of a higher
total salary. Should a pitcher believe his statistics will get worse in a hitter’s stadium, he
may deduce that there is instability in his expected future income and therefore require
the risk compensation.
Rosen (1986) surveys the literature on worker compensation models. The paper
is not an empirical paper. He instead defended his theories by referencing past papers
that studied specific labor markets. Citing various studies, he concludes that there is
evidence that firms typically compensate workers for earnings risk. For example, he
discusses one model that explains that firms will compensate workers at a risk premium if
the specific occupation does not allow laborers to work the desired number of hours at
the given hourly wage. This risk is similar to the stadium risk, as teams that play in a
hitter’s stadium understand that its environment is not ideal for pitchers, and must
therefore compensate them for the less-desirable situation.

11

The study uses mean wage as the dependent variable, while its control variables include: age, race, sex,
education, occupation, and union. Instability is measured by variation in annual income over six years.
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Another form of uncertainty with earnings risk is the question about future wages;
whether workers receive stable wage increases over time, or if future wages are unknown.
Mcgoldrick and Robst (1996) found that industries in which future earnings are unstable
tend to compensate workers for that uncertainty. Current wage offers in those industries
are therefore greater than in occupations in which future earnings are more certain.12
The Major League Baseball labor market is important to study, in part, because it
is a well-publicized, unionized market. Many of the risk compensation studies do not
discuss the inherent differences between union and non-union industries. They include
unions as control variables, but do not examine why union workers are treated differently
than non-union workers. Moore (1995) compared risk compensation between union and
non-union markets. He examined industries where workers risk losing hours because the
demand for output is unpredictable. Moore used a risk-union interaction term, along with
the typical variables included to establish workers’ salary. He determined that union
members are paid a higher percentage increase in their salary than non-union workers in
similar job markets, with every added unit of risk. This result explains that earnings risk
is most recognized in unionized labor markets. Therefore the examination of the Major
League Baseball labor market may lend support to the study of other unionized industries.
This is an important distinction because the quality of salary bargaining in Major League
Baseball is much more comparable to other unionized markets instead of non-union
markets.

12

The study uses mean industry wage as the dependent variable, while its control variables include age,
race, sex, education, occupation, and union. “Income risk is defined as the standard deviation of residual
earnings from individual earnings functions estimated over time and time squared.” Mcgoldrick and Robst
(1996)
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It is unclear whether these compensation theories hold for pitchers in Major
League Baseball. This paper tests these theories for individual pitchers by estimating
stadium effects on pitcher salary determination. It first models stadium effects under
perfect certainty. In this case, both the pitcher and team know what the effect is with no
uncertainty. The second model allows for the uncertainty of risk, which occurs when the
exact effect of the stadium is unknown. The examination of the uncertainty model
provides a conclusive result that answers the question: if a pitcher’s statistics are at risk
of getting worse because of where he plays, will that affect the determination of his salary
and lead to compensation?
2) Theory
The goal of a professional pitcher, as is the case with other labor service suppliers, is to
maximize utility. The main component of the utility function is consumption, which in
this study is assumed to be a function of income (I), so that: ∂U/ ∂I > 0.
I derive the formal model in two situations. The first is the case of perfect
certainty about the effect of a hitter’s stadium on each pitcher’s statistics, and the second
is to include uncertainty. When there is perfect certainty in the model, the measure of
change in a pitcher’s statistics is not a risk variable because the effect that each stadium
has on the pitcher’s statistics is known. The model with uncertainty involves risk
because the exact effect of each stadium is unknown.
Model with Perfect Certainty
The model assumes that a pitcher’s performance and statistics determine his salary. It is
a two period model, where the pitcher maximizes expected lifetime income by choosing
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between two offers, one from a team with a hitter’s park home stadium, and the other
with a neutral stadium. The options are summarized as follows:
V1 = U(Y11) + βU(Y12(x(g)))
V2 = U(Y21) + βU(Y22(x(g)))

(1)
(2)

where V1 is the summation of current and discounted future income (utility) when
playing in the hitter’s stadium, and V2 is the sum in a neutral stadium. Y11 is the current
salary the hitter’s stadium team offers to the pitcher, and is a function of player statistics
to date, while Y12 is the future salary offer. Y12 is a function of the statistics of the
pitcher from the first period (x), which is in turn a function of the stadium effect (g). The
same is true in the neutral stadium.13
The decision rule for the pitcher will be to choose the stadium option that
provides the highest salary, as more income leads to a higher utility. He will therefore
only consider playing in the hitter’s stadium if the sum of his salaries is greater than or
equal to the sum from the neutral stadium (V1 ≥ V2). The model assumes that a pitcher’s
salary depends on his performance. We therefore may claim that V1 and V2 are known in
the current time period. This is true because in an ideal environment with perfect
certainty, teams know exactly how the pitcher will perform in both stadiums. Therefore,
his current and future salaries are already known. In the hitter’s stadium, the current and
future salaries are still known because the effects of the stadium are also known for that
stadium.
With these assumptions, we may now solve for Y11 and derive the equation to
understand the relationship between the stadium effect and salary in an ideal environment
13

Y22 is a function of the statistics from the first period in the neutral stadium, which is in turn a function
of the neutral stadium effect.

11

Joseph Glatman Zaretsky

with perfect certainty. We begin by setting V1 equal to V2, as that is the lowest value of
V1 that the pitcher will accept to play in the hitter’s ballpark, and solve for U(Y11).
U(Y11) = U(Y21) + β[U(Y22) – U(Y12)]

(4)

The goal in the following derivation is to find ∂Y11/ ∂g.
All of the steps in the derivation can be found in the Appendix. The result of the
derivation is as follows:
∂Y11/ ∂g = β[∂Y22/ ∂x * ∂x/ ∂g - ∂Y12/ ∂x * ∂x/ ∂g]

(5)

If all teams know the exact effect of each stadium, then in the future, teams that offer a
pitcher coming from a hitter’s stadium a contract are able to separate the effect of the
stadium from his statistics and offer him a contract equal to his worth prior to the
stadium.14 Therefore, in equation (6), it can be considered that g is equal to zero in both
the neutral stadium and the hitter’s stadium sections. If g = 0, then the equation overall
will also equal zero, so that, ∂Y11/ ∂g = 0.
The hypothesis for the model with perfect certainty therefore, is that a pitcher will not in
fact receive any compensation for stadium risk.
Model with Uncertainty
In the model with uncertainty, the stadium effects on statistics are not perfectly
known. Along with the assumptions from the model with perfect certainty, this model
also assumes that players are risk neutral. There may be a great effect, making one
pitcher’s statistics significantly worse, or a pitcher can perform better than the expected
outcome. We begin again with the decision between V1 and V2.
V1 = U(Y11) + βEU(Y12)
14

(6)

Assuming the rest of his skills did not diminish.
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V2 = U(Y21) + βEU(Y22)
U(Y12) = p(g)(Y12Low(x(g))) + (1-p(g))(Y12High(x(g)))

(7)
(8)

The uncertainty is found in Y12.15 There are now two outcomes that are possible when
playing in the hitter’s stadium. Either it will affect the pitcher’s statistics by a large
amount, leading to a low future salary offer, or there will not be a great effect on his
statistics, and he will therefore receive a standard salary offer. These possibilities are
labeled Y12Low and Y12High, where p(g) is the probability of a large effect, and (1- p(g)) is
the probability of a small effect.
With this new assumption we use the same steps as the basic model to derive the
final equation. The full mathematical derivation can be found in the Appendix. The
result is as follows:
∂Y11/ ∂g = -[(p(g)( ∂Y12L/∂x * ∂x/ ∂g * g) - (1 – p(g))( ∂Y12H/∂x * ∂x/ ∂g * g))]

(9)

Once again, this result shows that the relationship between the type of stadium and Y11 is
positive; therefore a pitcher should theoretically be compensated to play in a hitter’s
ballpark.
We therefore come to the final guiding equation:
Salary = α0 + β1Performance + β2Stadium effect + β3Misc + ε

(10)

where Performance contains the various performance variables that are taken into
account to determine pitcher salary and Misc contains miscellaneous team variables that
would affect the salary offered by the team’s management.

15

Both Y12Low and Y12High are functions of the statistics from the current period, which is again a function
of the stadium effect.
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3) Summary Statistics
In order to test both the perfect certainty and uncertainty models, two different
measurements must be used. To test the perfect certainty model, this study uses the park
factor variable as a measure for the stadium effect, where the park factor indexes the
average number of runs scored in a stadium to the league average.16 By measuring the
specific effects of each stadium on the number of runs scored per game, the park factor
proxies for the effect of the stadium on pitcher performance. The park factor variable
works well as a proxy for the perfect certainty model because while the means of ERA
vary across stadiums, there is no significant difference in the variance. Thus in an ideal
environment, the stadium effect on a pitcher’s ERA is known.
To test the uncertainty model, this study uses a dummy variable denoting whether
or not a stadium is a domed stadium or an outdoor stadium. Using the test on the
variance and mean of ERA in indoor and outdoor stadiums, this study determines that
outdoor stadiums are riskier for pitchers than indoor stadiums overall. There is no
difference in the means of ERA, but the variance is greater in outdoor stadiums.
Therefore, one cannot determine the exact change in a pitcher’s ERA between stadium
types. These differing variances might be explained by factors such as the highly elevated

16

ESPN calculates the Park Factor as: Park Factor = ((homeRS + homeRA)/(homeG)) / ((roadRS +
roadRA)/(roadG)), where: homeRS=Runs scored at home, homeRA=Runs allowed at home,
homeG=number of home games, roadRS=Runs scored on the road, roadRA=Runs allowed on the road,
roadG=number of road games. The park factor is equal to the average number of runs scored in a stadium
indexed to the league average. A neutral stadium has a value of 1, while a hitter’s ballpark is any stadium
with a value over 1. The variable measures the specific effects each individual stadium has on the amount
of runs scored. In other words, if the pitcher’s stadium has a park factor of 1.1, then presumably the pitcher
will allow .1 more runs per game then in a typical stadium in the league (park factor is expressed in
runs/game).
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outdoor stadiums such as Coors Field, or the small dimensions found in many outdoor
stadiums such as Fenway Park.17
1) Model with Perfect Certainty
The data collected for the model with perfect certainty (using the park factor variable)
contain 3,719 observations that are season-by-season statistics of every pitcher that has
started over 60% of the games they have appeared in from 1990-2008.18 Major League
Baseball recorded the statistics for each game and posted them to final box scores. At the
end of each season, the statistics are added together to obtain the total season’s statistics.
These statistics were collected from both ESPN.com and Baseball-Reference.com.
Revenue data are available through the financial reports of each team. Though the teams
are privately owned, and standard regulations do not require the release of their financial
data, each team reports its revenue, according to Major League Baseball’s own policies.
These reported revenues were available on Forbes.com, and the revenues were manually
entered into the data set. Teams typically make salary data publicly available and were
collected by looking at each starting pitcher’s player pages on ESPN.com, and BaseballReference.com. The park factor variable was also found on ESPN.
Table I summarizes the final data and figure 1 presents histograms for the
respective variables. The yearly values of salary range from $100,000 to $22,000,000.
As expected, the histogram indicates a significant right skew seen in the salary data.

17

Coors field is located in Colorado, while Fenway is located in Boston.

18

This distinction was made because some starting pitchers will come in as relievers if necessary. If a
pitcher is a reliever in more than 40% of their appearances, however, it can be inferred that teams are likely
not paying them as a starting pitcher, but rather as a reliever or spot-starter.
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Taking the natural log of salary corrects for the skew.19 If not recorded, the salary for
rookies and players recalled from the minor leagues is assumed to be the minimum salary
for that year.20
The range for team revenue is also quite large, with a maximum of 327 million,
and a minimum of 24.9 million. The mean is approximately 106 million. The variable
shows a slight skew to the right, necessitating the natural log. The variable is divided by
1,000,000 for simplicity. Salary offers also typically change depending on the age of the
player. The mean age is 27.8 years, with the youngest pitcher being 19 and the oldest 46.
The team performance variables, fielding percentage and winning percentage, are both
normally distributed as seen in their histograms. The fielding percentage variable does
not vary much as the minimum is 97.2% and the maximum is 98.9%, with a mean of
98.2%.
The individual performance variables are all relatively normally distributed. The
average number of games started per year is approximately 22, with a maximum of 37.
Hits allowed during the season range from two to 284, with a mean of 138.4 and a
standard deviation of 70.6, as some pitchers only started one game in a certain season.
The means for walks and strikeouts are 46.7 and 93 respectively, with large ranges once
again because of the varying number of games started. Strikeouts again show the
different types of pitchers with a standard deviation of 59.71.

19

This results in an almost normally distributed curve, however there is still a large extension on the lower
end of the salaries because there are so many minimum salary contracts.
20

Minimum salary ranges from $100,000 in 1990 to $390,000 in 2008.
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Instead of including both wins and losses, I simply use the win-loss percentage,
which has a mean of .479, showing that the average pitcher actually has a losing record.21
The earned run average (ERA) has a range of zero to 43.2.22 The average ERA is 4.9.
To control for free agency, a dummy variable is also included to indicate when a
pitcher signed a new contract.23 Unfortunately, news of every new contract signed is not
readily available. This is evident by its small mean of 16.6%. The results of the study
therefore may not fully capture every time a new salary is offered to a pitcher.
The final variable is the park factor. The variable is normally distributed and, as
expected, has a mean of 1. The standard deviation is .114. If all of the stadiums were the
same, then the same number of runs would presumably be scored in each stadium,
leading the park factor to equal one for each stadium. Since all stadiums are not the same,
it is simply a measure of how many more runs, on average, are scored at one park
compared to the other parks. Therefore, the mean of one was expected, and the standard
deviation of .114 is beneficial for this study, as it is fairly large for a variable whose
minimum and maximum is .606 and 1.412, respectively.24
2) Uncertainty Model with Risk
The data used to examine the uncertainty model contain 24,268 observations that are the
game’s logs for every game pitched by every starting pitcher between 2004 and 2008,

21

Starting pitchers do not record wins and losses for every game in which they participate. Sometimes
relievers get the decision depending on the situation.
22

One pitcher had an ERA of 99.99, however he was removed because he was an outlier that had not
recorded any innings pitched.
23

An observation with a value of 1 indicates a year the player signed a new contract.

24

The stadiums with the minimum and maximum park factors are Petco Park and Coors Field respectively.
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plus his yearly salary, and the yearly team performance variables. The data for this
model are different from the perfect certainty model so that we can investigate the
specific differences that arise when pitching in a domed stadium compared to an outdoor
stadium on a game-by-game basis.
The editors from Baseball-Reference.com entered these statistics from the box
scores into a comprehensive dataset, and allowed its use for this study. I calculated some
statistics, such as game ERA, and innings pitched per game, using the given data, and
manually entered them into the data set. The remaining data, such as team revenue and
salaries, are collected from the same sources as the data from the perfect certainty model.
One problem with the data arose in the unavailability of information regarding
retractable roofs. There is no available record that shows which specific games were
played with the stadium roof open, and which were played with it closed. There are also
games during the season in which the roof is closed or opened mid-game. These games
are only found in a small percentage of the data set. The stadiums that have retractable
roofs are: Arizona, Houston, Milwaukee, Seattle, and Toronto. We considered these
games to be indoor games, as any time there is a weather factor that may affect a
pitcher’s statistics, the roof is typically closed.
Table II summarizes the data used in the uncertainty estimation and figure 2
presents the histograms for the respective variables. Before changing the retractable roof
stadiums to indoor, approximately 90% of all games were played outdoors. Once
changing the variable to include retractable roof stadiums, the difference between the two
possibilities becomes more useful. The mean now shows that 76.2% of the games were
played outdoors.

18
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The salary variable is the dependent variable. The yearly values range from
$300,000 to $22,500,000. There is again a significant right skew in the data when
viewing the histogram, necessitating the natural log.25 If unreported, the salary for
rookies and players recalled from the minor leagues is assumed to be the minimum salary
for that year.
The variable for team revenue has a maximum of $327 million, while the
minimum is $80 million, and the mean is $156 million. The variable is also normally
distributed. There is a clear distinction between the small-market teams that may be less
willing to compensate their pitchers, and the large-market teams that typically have more
money to spend. Small-market and large-market teams typically do not change from
year-to-year, so it is usually known which teams have the most money to spend. The
revenue variable is divided by 1,000,000 for simplicity.
The team performance variables, fielding percentage and winning percentage, are
both normally distributed. This was expected because there are typically only a few elite
teams, and a few very bad teams, with all of the others in between. Even with the
difference between elite and poor teams, the fielding percentage does not vary much as
the minimum is 97.7% and the maximum is 98.9%, with a mean of 98.3%. Team
winning percentage ranges significantly with the minimum of .315 and the maximum
of .648, with the mean predictably falling at .499.
The five individual player performance variables are all relatively normally
distributed. Innings pitched per game ranges from one third of an inning to 10 innings,

25

This results in an almost normally distributed curve, however there is still a large extension on the lower
end of the salaries because of so many minimum salary contracts, as can be seen in the first histogram.
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with a mean of 5.859 and a standard deviation of 1.52. Hits and walks allowed both have
minimums of zero, and maximums of 15 and 10 respectively. Strikeouts also vary, as the
range is from zero to 18, with a mean of approximately four. The fairly large standard
deviation of 2.39 shows how some pitchers are strikeout-pitchers, while others are not.
The most interesting variable is ERA, in which the range is from zero to 270. The range
is large because some pitchers allow many runs in just one third of an inning, before
being replaced. With the maximum value so high, and with so many games in which
zero earned runs were allowed, the histogram returns a slight skew to the right, but is still
relatively normally distributed. This range also explains the rather large standard
deviation of 8.38.
4) Analysis
Perfect Certainty Model Results
Table IV reports the final regression results.26 Regression (i) shows the main regression
using the full data set. The park factor variable returned a positive coefficient, indicating
that if the park factor increases by one run-per-game, the salary of that pitcher should
increase by 17.3%. The coefficient, however, is statistically insignificant, as can be seen
by the absolute value of the t-statistic equal to 1.42. Therefore, this result follows the
original hypothesis that players are not compensated in the perfect certainty model. Due
to the fact that park factor is an imperfect proxy for the perfect certainty model, the
coefficient returned a positive value instead of simply zero.
The team revenue variable returned a positive and significant coefficient with a
value of 0.754, and a t-statistic of 23.98. This result is not surprising, as team revenues
26

See Appendix B for estimation issues.
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range widely and teams with higher revenues have much larger payrolls. This is evident
in the yearly revenue reports, as the large-market teams such as the New York Yankees
and Mets annually have the highest payrolls. Small-market teams such as the Oakland
Athletics and Pittsburgh Pirates regularly reside near the bottom of the list. The other
team variable, fielding percentage, returned a surprising coefficient, as it was much larger
than any other variable and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient returned a value
of 14.131. This may be a result of the more elite and richer teams possessing fielders
who are superior to the less wealthy teams that offer pitcher smaller contracts.
The coefficients on the age and age2 variables are positive and negative
respectively, and both are significant. This result is consistent with expectations, as
teams should offer a pitcher at a young age a higher salary as he improves. Once he
reaches a certain point however, his potential improvement diminishes, and his salary
offers do not increase nearly as much.
The signed contract variable, however, does not return the expected result.
Theory hypothesizes that, each time a player signs a new contract, his salary offer
typically increases. The significant results, however, show that the average time a player
signs a new contract, his salary decreases by 30.2%. This is highly unexpected, and the
reason for this is unknown. One explanation however, could be that the limited
information regarding when players signed a new contract left the variable incomplete.
Should all of the new contracts and contract extensions be made readily available, the
result of the regression may return a coefficient closer to expectations. Another
possibility is that the good players sign long-term contracts early in their careers.
Therefore, the players signing new contracts most often are those who are not as skilled.
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Therefore, as they continue to sign more contracts, their offers lessen because they are
not the good players in the league. The other coefficients do not change much if the
signed contract variable is removed.
Some of the results for the performance variables were unexpected. The variables
that return expected results are strikeouts per game (SO/GM), games started (GS),
innings pitched per game (IP/GM), walks per game (BB/GM), win-loss percentage (WL%), and opponent on base percentage plus slugging percentage (OPS). Walks per game,
win-loss percentage, and on base percentage plus slugging percentage, all return
insignificant coefficients. The coefficient on strikeouts is a positive value of 0.179, and
is significant at a 1% level with a t-statistic of 10.12. The value of the coefficient is
consistent with expectations, as it usually garners a lot of attention when evaluating the
skills of a pitcher in the previous literature.
The performance variables that do not follow the initial hypothesis are hits per
game (H/GM) and ERA. Both hits and ERA returned positive coefficients significant at
a 5% and 1% level respectively. This result implies that with each added hit and each
added run (per nine innings) allowed by the pitcher, his salary should increase by 7.6%
and 5% respectively. This raises concern, as the more hits and runs a pitcher allows
should not increase the amount that he is paid. This result suggests that the model may
be wrongly specified, though it is consistent with the theories used in the previous
literature. One explanation for this inconsistency may be that the pitchers with the
highest salaries typically pitch more innings than other pitchers. Therefore there is a
greater opportunity for those high paid pitchers to allow more total hits than the other
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starters. The ERA variable still leaves questions, as it is hypothesized that the higher
paid pitchers have lower ERAs.
Perfect Certainty Model Robustness
The surprising results must be verified with robustness tests. In order to ensure that the
park factor variable is not the cause for the strange results, regression (ii) shows the
results with the variable omitted. No coefficients changed by any significant degree.
The next test to better understand the results is to split the data between the
National and American Leagues, the two leagues in Major League Baseball. Regressions
(iii) and (iv) report the results, with the third regression using the American League data,
and the fourth regression using the National League data. The results between the two
regressions show a clear distinction between the leagues. The results of the American
League regression return the same signs on each coefficient when compared to the
original regression, though some variables lost their significance.27 The one main
difference, however, is that the park factor variable is positive and significant at the 5%
level. The results indicate that a pitcher’s salary increases by 48.5% with an increase of a
full run-per-game in park factor. This coefficient is much larger than that from the
original regression, while the values of the other variables do not change very much,
other than team fielding, which both lost its significance and saw its coefficient change to
0.689. As we can see in the summary statistics, park factor never actually increases by a
full run; therefore the likely increase in pitcher’s salary will be much less than 48.5%.
Instead, if the park factor increases by one standard deviation, the estimation implies that

27

Innings pitched, hits, and team fielding.
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a pitcher’s salary would increase by 6.3%. Therefore, the results from the American
League does not follow the original hypothesis.
The National League regression also changes very little in the performance and
team variables,28 but the park factor variable becomes very small, negative, and
insignificant. This result shows that there is a clear difference in the way the two leagues
value their pitchers and determine their salaries.
The biggest reason for the significance seen in the park factor variable in the
American League and not the National League, is likely attributed to the designated hitter
(DH) rule. The American League uses designated hitters that bat for the pitchers, while
the National League must have the pitchers hit, therefore making offense in the American
League much stronger. To attempt to better understand the statistical difference between
the two leagues, tables V and VI show the summary statistics of the leagues. The ERA
variable is much larger in the American League, and therefore may be the cause for the
significant result of the park factor variable. The mean park factor variable in the
American League is 1.011, while the mean in the National League is .992. This
difference may account for some of the results as well, though it certainly would not
account for all of it.
The final robustness test was to use only the pitchers where the signed contract
variable is available. This was done to see if the ERA and hits variables might change
when the data set is minimized to players where every variable is accounted for. The
variables did in fact change, as ERA remained positive but became insignificant, and hits
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24

Joseph Glatman Zaretsky

became negative and insignificant. This shows that the signed contract variable may be
quite important for this study, as it began to correct the unexpected results.29
These robustness checks confirm the results of the performance variables, but
introduce new questions regarding the difference between the American and National
Leagues. It is clear that the results from the National League regarding the park factor
variable overtake those from the American League in the initial regression.
Uncertainty Model Results
Table VIII reports the final regression results.30 Regression (i) shows the main regression
using the full data set. As hypothesized, the stadium type variable returned a positive
coefficient with significance at the 1% level. The coefficient shows that by playing in an
outdoor stadium, a pitcher’s salary is likely to increase by approximately 6.8%.
The team revenue variable returned a positive and significant coefficient at the
1% level. The value of the coefficient explains that an increase in $1,000,000 of team
revenue leads to a .42% increase in salary. The other team variables, winning percentage
and fielding percentage, both returned insignificant results. The coefficient for winning
percentage was negative, but insignificant.
The strikeouts variable returned positive and significant results at the 5% level, as
was expected by the theory. The number of walks allowed by a pitcher, as well as
innings pitched also followed the hypothesis, as the coefficients were negative and
positive respectively and significant at the 1% level. Innings pitched has the largest
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The same test was also run with all of the statistics lagged to a year prior to the signed contract, but there
was no significant difference between the results before and after lagging.
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See Appendix C for estimation issues.
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effect on salary for any of the performance variables, as each added inning pitched per
game is expected to increase salary by approximately 17.7%. This shows that the
durability of a pitcher is relevant to teams as they determine his salary. Some of the
results for the performance variables were unexpected, as in the perfect certainty model.
The three variables were ERA, total hits allowed per game, and team winning percentage.
Similar to the perfect certainty model, hits and ERA show positive coefficients, and were
significant at a 1% level. This raises concern, as the more hits and runs a pitcher allows
should not increase the amount that he is paid. The winning percentage was negative but
insignificant. It was expected that if the team’s winning percentage increased, the players
would be paid more because they helped the team improve, but the results show the
opposite. These results suggest that there may be a variable omitted that would help
control for these unexpected performance factors.
Uncertainty Model Robustness
To test for robustness, I split the data into two sets: one for the American League,
and the second for the National League.31 The regression results from both leagues are
reported in table VIII. Regression (ii) shows the results from the National League. The
results for many of the variables remain unchanged from the main regression. The walks
variable loses its significance, but retains it negative sign. The winning percentage
variable becomes significant, but remained negative, which is a concerning result. The
variable in question, stadium type also changed, becoming both negative and
insignificant. Though this result is opposite from the initial regression, it may be
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Both data sets were once again tested for all of the potential estimation issues, and the same issues were
discovered and corrected for in each set.
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explained by the lack of offensive production in the National League, therefore, taking
away the significant variance that was initially found.
The regression results using American League data support this hypothesis.
Regression (iii) reports the results. As expected, the American League returned a
positive and significant result on the stadium type variable. We see that in the American
League, players are paid approximately 14.46% more if they typically play in an outdoor
stadium as opposed to an indoor stadium. All other variables have the same signs and
significance except for the winning percentage, which became significant. The
coefficients themselves had only minor changes.
Surprisingly, there are more outdoor stadiums in the National League, as can be
seen in tables IX and X respectively. The difference in compensation then may be a
reflection of the better offense in the American League, or the fact that the American
League has more elite teams.32
With these checks, it can be inferred that the original results are indeed acceptable,
even though the National League actually diminishes the significance of that result.
5) Conclusion
This study examined whether or not Major League Baseball teams take the risk of
pitching in a hitter’s ballpark into account when determining the salary offers for starting
pitchers. The results of this study showed that the risk of playing in an outdoor stadium
as opposed to an indoor stadium does indeed have a significant effect on a pitcher’s
salary when examining the entire league. An unexpected result of the study, however,
was the fundamental difference between the American League, where the risk of playing
32

Team winning percentage is higher in the American League when compared to the National League.
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in an outdoor stadium seems to be significant, and the National League, where the
coefficient is not statistically different from zero.
The other unexpected results from the test, such as the opposite signs on various
performance coefficients leads me to believe that there is either a variable missing, or
specified incorrectly. There may be other variables considered by teams that are not as
clear or known as these performance variables. The adjusted R2 of the uncertainty model
is approximately 0.15. Therefore other variables may be missing from this study and are
unknown to this study or the previous literature. Certain variables that have recently
been introduced to the baseball industry may provide a better method to evaluate the
skills of pitchers. One specific variable is the Fielder Independent Pitching (FIP)
statistic.33 This variable calculates a pitcher’s ERA independent from any situations
where team fielding is involved, and only focuses on those statistics for which a pitcher is
solely responsible. This statistic is a recent discovery and has not been made readily
available for collection for many of the years studied in this paper.
The examination of the model with perfect certainty also returns both exciting and
unexpected results. The park factor variable is not significant in the general regression,
as was expected in the theory. Once again, however, the American League robustness
check returns a positive and significant coefficient, while the National League was
negative and insignificant. The R2 value of each regression remains close to .599
however, which is a fairly strong value. Therefore, the likelihood of an omitted variable
bias diminishes in this regression.

33

FIP = (HR*13 + (BB + HBP – IBB)*3 – K*2)/IP
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Further analysis into this subject could help teams determine whether or not
certain salary offers are fair for both sides. If the data regarding signed contracts were
fully collected, the regressions may be able to return more complete results. This seems
clear, as the robustness test showed the potential effect that a fully collected signed
contract variable may have. This study may be improved further by indicating when
players were eligible for salary arbitration, and when they were signed away from their
rookie contracts. This would help differentiate the rookie contracts and determine which
were paid as rookies, and which were paid as top draft picks and given higher starting
salaries.34
This study can also be implemented in other industries other than athletics, where
there are similar environmental constraints on the performance of the worker.

34

Not all rookies are treated the same in salary negotiations.
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Figure 1. Histograms
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5) Hits

6) Earned Run Average

7) Walks

8) Strikeouts
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9) Win-Loss Percentage

10) Team Fielding Percentage

11) Age

11) On Base Plus Slugging
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Figure 2. Histograms
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Appendix A: Theory
Derivation of basic model:
V1 = U(Y11) + βU[Y12(x(g))]
V2 = U(Y21) + βU[Y22(x(g))]
Where x = statistics prior to current period, and g = stadium effect
The pitcher will therefore only choose V1 if:
V1 ≥ V2
Given the assumptions described in the theory section:
Y12 < Y22 => Y11 > Y21
Set V1 = V2, solve for U(Y11)
U(Y11) = U(Y21) + β[U(Y22) – U(Y12)]
To solve for the effect of the hitter’s ballpark on salary, I assume the following functional
form for utility:
U(Yij) = Yij
The following steps are therefore used to derive the model:
Y11 = Y21 + β(Y22(x(g)) – Y12(x(g)))
From here we may take the derivative and solve for ∂Y11/ ∂g:
∂Y11/ ∂g = β[∂Y22/ ∂x * ∂x/ ∂g - ∂Y12/ ∂x * ∂x/ ∂g
In the neutral stadium, the stadium effect (g in Y22) is equal to zero and it is also
considered zero in the hitter’s stadium. Therefore, the final equation is the following:
∂Y11/ ∂g = 0
Derivation of model with uncertainty:
V1 = U(Y11) + βEU(Y12)
V2 = U(Y21) + βU(Y22)
Where E = expected value and Y12 = [p(g)(Y12Low(x(g))) + (1-p(g))(Y12High(x(g)))]
The pitcher will therefore only choose V1 if:
V1 ≥ V2
Given the assumptions described in the theory section:
Y12 < Y22 => Y11 > Y21
Set V1 = V2, solve for U(Y11)
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U(Y11) = U(Y21) + β[U(Y22) – E(U(Y12))]
To solve for the effect of the hitter’s ballpark on salary, I assume the following functional
form for utility:
U(Yij) = Yij
Y11 = Y21 + β(Y22 – E(Y12))
From here we may take the derivative and solve for ∂Y11/ ∂g:
∂Y11/ ∂g = β[∂Y22/ ∂x * ∂x/ ∂g – ((pr(g)(∂Y12L/∂x * ∂x/ ∂g * g ) - (1 – pr(g))(∂Y12H/∂x * ∂x/
∂g * g)))]
In the neutral stadium, the stadium effect (g in Y22) is equal to zero. Therefore, the final
equation is the following:
∂Y11/ ∂g = -β[((p(g)(∂Y12L/∂x * ∂x/ ∂g * ) + (1 – p(g))(∂Y12H/∂x * ∂x/ ∂g * g)))]
and where ∂x/ ∂g < 0.

46

Joseph Glatman Zaretsky

Appendix B: Perfect Certainty Estimation Issues
I tested the data for various estimation issues. The data are organized as unbalanced
panel data, where there is a panel for each season of a pitcher’s career. There is
multicollinearity seen in this data set. The multicollinearity however, did not lead me to
remove any variables. Each variable has a different effect with regard to the pitcher’s
value. To address this, I transform the multicollinear variables (strikeouts, walks, innings
pitched, and hits) by dividing them by the total number of games pitched for each pitcher.
As can be seen in table III, the new correlation coefficients show that there is little
multicollinearity between the variables. One might expect the pitcher ERA and the park
factor variables to be highly correlated. They are not because the park factor is only for
the pitcher’s home games, therefore all away games are reflected in the ERA but not the
park factor.
I use the Newey West Standard Errors to correct for the strong serial correlation
exhibited by the data. The Breusch-Pagan test finds no heteroskedasticity. The teamfielding variable is the only variable found to contain non-stationarity, and I correct for
the non-stationarity by using the first difference. After first differencing, the Durbin
Watson test once again indicated serial correlation, which I corrected for by using Newey
West Standard Errors.
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Appendix C: Uncertainty Model Estimation Issues
The data are again organized as unbalanced panel data, where there is a panel for each
game of a pitcher’s career. As can be seen in table VII, the simple correlations do not
indicate multicollinearity. The correlation between innings pitched and ERA returns the
most significant coefficient of -.63, with only one other combination of variables
reaching 0.43. ERA is partially calculated using innings pitched, which explains the
correlation between the two. We consider both necessary in the equation however, and
do not eliminate them.
The Durbin-Watson test repeated for each panel, as well as the partial
autocorrelation graphs, indicate strong serial correlation, which I corrected by using
Newey West standard errors.
On randomly chosen cross sectional units, the Breusch-Pagan test failed to reject
the null hypothesis that there is constant variance. Therefore, it can be inferred that there
is no heteroskedasticity in the data, and no correction is needed.
I tested for stationarity using the Dickey Fuller test, panel by panel, for every
variable included in the regression. The performance variables; strikeouts, walks, hits,
innings pitched, and ERA, all returned results that reject the null hypothesis, which states
that the variable has a unit root, for most of the panels. The stadium type dummy
variable also rejected the null hypothesis for almost all of the panels. The remaining
variables, nominal team revenue, team winning percentage, and team fielding percentage,
all failed to reject the null hypothesis, therefore leading to the conclusion that they are
non-stationary. We also tested the residual for stationarity to determine if there was
cointegration, but the residual failed to reject the null hypothesis. This outcome requires
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the use of first differences for those variables that were found to be nonstationary. I reran
the regression using the first differences variables, and retested for serial correlation. The
Durbin Watson test and partial autocorrelation graphs once again indicated serial
correlation, which I corrected by using Newey West standard errors.
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